Abstract
The reasons why the British insisted so strongly that Prince Paul should abandon his benevolent neutrality and that Yugoslavia should go to war, whatever the cost, why they in fact forced Hitler to undertake an operation against Yugoslavia which he had not intended, at any rate at that time, can be understood only in the light of their doubts and fears about the outcome of the Balkan campaign of 1941. This campaign — so strongly criticised after the event — was seen from the start as a military gamble, justifiable only in so far as it enabled Britain to keep or win allies on the continent of Europe.
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© 1976 Elisabeth Barker
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Barker, E. (1976). The Balkan Campaign, 1941. In: British Policy in South-East Europe in the Second World War. Studies in Russian and East European History. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-02196-3_10
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-02196-3_10
Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, London
Print ISBN: 978-1-349-02198-7
Online ISBN: 978-1-349-02196-3
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