Human Action and Psychological Research

  • Robert Borger


The continuing philosophical interest in action and the careful analysis to which it and related concepts such as intention are subjected stands in sharp contrast to the almost total absence of even the relevant terms from the psychological literature; when the word action is used it tends to be treated as interchangeable with activity, with behaviour, reaction or response. Are psychologists, in blurring or ignoring distinctions that are regarded as central in the philosophy of psychology, missing something essential, do the methods and the problems of psychology really pass one another by in a fundamental way? In this paper I want to examine this type of stricture in relation to possible psychological contributions towards an elucidation of action.


Psychological Research Basic Action Conceptual Scheme Psychological Theory Success Condition 
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Copyright information

© Royal Institute of Philosophy 1974

Authors and Affiliations

  • Robert Borger

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