Conceptual Prolegomena to a Psychological Theory of Intentional Action
During most of this century, psychology has advertised itself, at least in the United States, as the ‘science of behaviour’. Presumably the essential aim of such a science will be to construct theories the dependent variables of which will be types or dimensions of behaviour. Now it is quite unclear, and has been from the early days of behaviourism, just what the term ‘behaviour’ is intended to include. When one finds perception, thought, and feeling ranged under that heading, it is difficult to resist the conclusion that the label ‘behaviour’ is simply used to legitimise anything the psychologist wishes to study. However, whatever else it may include, the category of behaviour has from the beginning been designed to range over familiar examples of human action. The ‘science of behaviour’ is explicitly intended to provide a theoretical understanding (explanation) of the things we do in daily life. Pronouncements to this effect abound from Watson on.
KeywordsPhysicalistic Theory Intentional Action Psychological Theory Success Condition Overt Behaviour
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