The Computer as a Mistaken Model of the Mind

  • Hubert Dreyfus
  • John Haugeland


The most dramatic and potentially revolutionary development in recent psychology is the suggestion that psychological explanations may be formulable as computer programmes. Such a suggestion has immense prima facie appeal to the scientific and philosophical community, for it seems to approach some kind of ideal of scientific explanation and intellectual understanding. But this very attractiveness should make us cautious. Before accepting such a programme of research unreflectively, we should try to make explicit the assumptions behind its approach. Baring these presuppositions might expose difficulties and equivocations not otherwise readily apparent.


Turing Machine Psychological Explanation Soap Bubble Machine Table Philosophical Community 
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Copyright information

© Royal Institute of Philosophy 1974

Authors and Affiliations

  • Hubert Dreyfus
  • John Haugeland

There are no affiliations available

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