The Computer as a Mistaken Model of the Mind
The most dramatic and potentially revolutionary development in recent psychology is the suggestion that psychological explanations may be formulable as computer programmes. Such a suggestion has immense prima facie appeal to the scientific and philosophical community, for it seems to approach some kind of ideal of scientific explanation and intellectual understanding. But this very attractiveness should make us cautious. Before accepting such a programme of research unreflectively, we should try to make explicit the assumptions behind its approach. Baring these presuppositions might expose difficulties and equivocations not otherwise readily apparent.
KeywordsTuring Machine Psychological Explanation Soap Bubble Machine Table Philosophical Community
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