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Preamble

  • Duncan Burn
Part of the Trade Policy Research Centre book series

Abstract

The history of the AGR in Phase II was a source of progressive disillusion. In 1967, though there were warning lights, the AGR was still expected to provide competitive power within a few years and widely, if less generally, to secure export orders. Its development potential was still said on high authority to promise sensational reductions in the cost of power within a decade. But some design difficulties were causing delays: others followed each other in constant succession, repeatedly putting back the date at which one of the plants would work. Two finally began to work at low power early in 1976. Domestic orders had come slowly. None came after early 1970. There were no export orders. In 1973 the CEGB announced it would buy no more AGRs. When those on order worked they would, initially at any rate, produce less than their designed power, and the designs would not be satisfactory to repeat. The CEGB decided to buy instead PWRs of American design. They would, they concluded, produce cheaper power than the AGR. They were, moreover, proven reactors.

Keywords

Energy Crisis Construction Company National State Socialism General Electric Company Member Firm 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Duncan Burn and the Trade Policy Research Centre 1978

Authors and Affiliations

  • Duncan Burn

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