Though the outbreak of war meant that the quest for the Mesopotamian oil concession had temporarily to be abandoned, Middle East oil concessions still remained an important British Government preoccupation. War brought home forcibly to the Government its almost complete dependence on foreign oil supplies and obliged it to develop a policy and an organisation for ensuring that oil supplies were adequate, both for its wartime activities and for afterwards. Further, Middle East oil also became involved in questions of military strategy and post-war territorial ambitions. The wartime interdependence of strategy and supply thus meant that Middle East oil concessions played an important part in the evolution of British Government oil policy.
KeywordsBritish Company Military Strategy British Control British Interest Royal Dutch Company
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