Accountability and Independence in Federal Grants-in-aid
My purposes here are primarily analytic and secondarily programmatic. I hope to present a framework for analysis, which will include elaboration of some of the dimensions and problems involved, and to argue in favor of emphasis upon one particular kind of accountability and the need for the training of professional program evaluators to do the job of program evaluation that is required.
KeywordsPolitical Economy Federal Government Public Assistance Grant Program Project Grant
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- 1.See Paul Appleby, Big Democracy (Knopf, New York, 1945), for a classic articulation of the myth that public agencies mean devotion to the public interest.Google Scholar
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