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Accountability and the Military-Industrial Complex

  • Martin Edmonds

Abstract

In substance, if not in detail, most studies on the American ‘military-industrial complex’ argue the existence of a coalescence of interest between industrial, political and military groups. This has been interpreted by some as an élite conspiracy;1 to others it represents a form of ‘subgovernment,’ whose purpose is ‘to strive to become self sustaining in control of power in its own sphere. (It)... seeks to aggregate power necessary to its purposes.’2

Keywords

Defense Industry Military Spending Weapon System Government Procurement Cost Overrun 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Notes

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Copyright information

© Carnegie Corporation of New York 1975

Authors and Affiliations

  • Martin Edmonds

There are no affiliations available

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