Abstract
We lack a good taxonomy of possible methods of administrative control, and this chapter is no more than a first attempt at providing one, submitted for criticism and development by others. We subsume taxation and other similar arrangements under the general idea of control.
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Notes
F. P. Dunne, Mr Dooley in Peace and War (Richards, London, 1889) p. 173.
This is well exemplified in a French case study by Michel Crozier, Le Phénomène Bureaucratique (Le Seuil, Paris, 1963).
This is well worked out by Ronald Frankenberg, Village on the Border (Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 1957).
See, for example, Martin Edmonds, ‘Government Contracting in Industry: Some observations on the Ferranti and Bristol Siddeley Contracts’, in Bruce L. R. Smith and D. C. Hague (eds ), The Dilemma of Accountability in Modern Government (Macmillan, London, 1971) p. 148.
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© 1975 D. C. Hague, W. J. M. Mackenzie and A. Barker
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Mackenzie, W.J.M., Hood, C.C. (1975). Administrative Control, Collusive Conflict and Uncoupled Hierarchies. In: Public Policy and Private Interests. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-01868-0_2
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-01868-0_2
Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, London
Print ISBN: 978-1-349-01870-3
Online ISBN: 978-1-349-01868-0
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