The economic system which prevailed in the Comecon countries1 up to about the mid-1960s was noted for a highly hierarchical structure of planning and management. In each country, five-year, annual and quarterly plans were determined by the State Planning Commission, in which the details of inputs, targets to be reached, the distribution of the output produced and even methods of production were all handed down the hierarchical ladder. These details were worked out by the Commission by means of input-output tables and finally compressed into a systematic ‘matrix of inter-branch balances’ showing the so-called technical coefficients of production (also known as technical norms of production or coefficients of material utilization, or coefficients of material intensity).
KeywordsTechnological Progress National Income Technical Progress Socialist Economy Fixed Capital
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- 8.e.g. in Poland, even in the late 1960s, the enterprise incentive fund was reducible by 20 per cent for every 1 per cent of the under-fulfilled plan, and if the plan was under-fulfilled by more than 5 per cent no allocation was allowed to the incentive fund. S. Dulski, Jakość produkcji (Quality of Production), Warsaw, PWE, 1971, p. 299.Google Scholar
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