Developing Countries in the Liberalisation of World Trade

  • David Wall


In response to a variety of factors, serious inter-governmental discussions got under way at the time of the monetary crisis of of 1971 on how trade between developed countries might be further liberalised. While fresh trade negotiations between developed countries are greatly to be welcomed, it is important that the effects of the resulting liberalisation on the trading interests of less developed countries should be taken into consideration, in order that they might be accommodated. Some aspects of trade liberalisation in the past have tended to harm such interests both relatively and absolutely.


Comparative Advantage World Trade Trade Liberalisation Trade Arrangement Tariff Preference 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.


Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.


  1. 1.
    See, for example, Harry G. Johnson, Economic Policies toward Less Developed Countries (Washington: Brookings Institution, 1967), andGoogle Scholar
  2. John Pincus, Trade, Aid and Development (New York: McGraw-Hill, for the Council on Foreign Relations, 1967).Google Scholar
  3. 2.
    A general discussion of these schemes can be found in Brian Hindley, “The UNCTAD Agreement on Preferences”, Journal of World Trade Law, London, September, 1971.Google Scholar
  4. 3.
    Part IN, General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, in Basic Instruments and Selected Documents Vol. IV (Geneva: GATT Secretariat, 1969), pp. 53–7.Google Scholar
  5. 5.
    For an analysis of the European Community’s scheme of generalised tariff preferences, see Richard N. Cooper, “The EEC Preferences: a Critical Evaluation”, Intereconomics, Hamburg, April, 1972.Google Scholar
  6. Also see David Wall, “Trade Issues for the Developing Countries”, in Britain, the EEC and the Third World (London: Overseas Development Institute, 1972), pp. 38–46.Google Scholar
  7. 6.
    There is a political point, too, that might be mentioned. If an American scheme of tariff preferences is to be implemented, the necessary enabling legislation might only be got through the United States Congress if it is part of a broad strategy, covering the general liberalisation of trade in both industrial and agricultural products, accompanied by a comprehensive domestic adjustment assistance programme. See Hugh Corbet, “Global Challenge to Commercial Diplomacy”, Pacific Community, Tokyo, October, 1971, p. 231.Google Scholar
  8. 7.
    Tor a discussion of arrangements for tariff preferences in favour of developing countries as an integral part of a major trade initiative for further liberalising world trade, see Wall, “Opportunities for Developing Countries”, in Johnson (ed.), Trade Strategy for Rich and Poor Nations (London: Allen & Unwin, 1971), pp. 27–94.Google Scholar

Copyright information

© Trade Policy Research Centre 1972

Authors and Affiliations

  • David Wall

There are no affiliations available

Personalised recommendations