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The Self as a Relatively Constant Mass of Bodily Feeling

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Personal Identity

Part of the book series: Problems of Philosophy ((PRPH))

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Abstract

We began with Hume’s ‘labyrinth’, the state of perplexity into which he got when he asked himself ‘whether in pronouncing concerning the identity of a person, we observe some real bond among his perceptions, or only feel one among the ideas we form of them’ (42, p. 259). After exploring this labyrinth a little, we established landmarks, in the form of the Unity Question and the Identity Question. The Unity Question is about what unites a succession of experiences, making them the same person’s experiences. The Identity Question is about what is essential to personal identity.

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© 1974 Godfrey Vesey

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Vesey, G. (1974). The Self as a Relatively Constant Mass of Bodily Feeling. In: Personal Identity. Problems of Philosophy. Palgrave, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-01684-6_3

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