On Whether ‘God’ is a Descriptive Predicable Term
As I commented in the last chapter, it seems that ‘God’ is not only an ordinary general term, a descriptive predicable term (Frege’s Begrswort), but also a substantival one by Geach’s criterion since it does seem to make clear sense to prefix ‘the same’ to ‘God’ and to so sensibly prefix it it is not necessary to introduce some other term, as it is in the case of adjectival general terms (e.g. ‘red’), which such other term would furnish us with a criterion of continued identity in Geach’s sense. What then are the supposed difficulties in holding that ‘God’ is a descriptive predicable term?
KeywordsDefinite Description True Proposition Abstract Term Plural Form Abstract Noun
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Notes and References
- Reprinted in Peter Geach, God and the Soul (Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 1969) pp. 42–64.Google Scholar
- Dr Kenny, The Five Ways (Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 1969), p. 56.Google Scholar
- For an interesting discussion of Quine’s position see Fred Sommers ‘Predicability’, Max Black (ed.), Philosophy in America (Muirhead Library of Philosophy, George Allen and Unwin, London, 1965) pp. 262–81.Google Scholar
- G. E. L. Owen, ‘Aristotle on the Snares of Ontology’, R. Bambrough (ed.), New Essays on Plato and Aristotle (Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 1965) p. 78.Google Scholar
- Cf. Flew and Maclntyre (eds.), New Essays in Philosophical Theology (S.C.M. Press, London, 1955), pp. 4–5.Google Scholar