Abstract
The framework for public expenditure decisions explored in Chapters 2 to 4 is grounded on individualistic assumptions. The satisfaction of social wants, in this approach, must rest on the preferences of sovereign consumers. Optimality for the public sector is conceived of in terms of conformity with individual preferences in a manner strictly analogous to the conformity with preferences that defines Pareto optimality in the private sector.
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© 1971 Jesse Burkhead and Jerry Miner
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Burkhead, J., Miner, J. (1971). The Politics of Collective Choice. In: Public Expenditure. Aldine Treatises in Modern Economics. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-01372-2_5
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-01372-2_5
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