Abstract
This paper1 suffers from a disconcerting generality. I need an excuse for wandering from Wittgenstein’s Tractatus to Picasso’s drawing of a Weeping Woman, via the philosophy of science and the theory of sense data. The thesis of the paper is that I have such an excuse. These are all areas where the concept of representation either exists in its own right, or has been found to be illuminating by philosophers. An important question is whether it could be the same concept in all these cases. I wish to claim that there is an illuminating common concept, even though to find it may require some fairly drastic modifications of some of the philosophical theses that are involved.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution.
Preview
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
Copyright information
© 1973 The Royal Institute of Philosophy
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Harrison, A. (1973). Representation and Conceptual Change. In: Philosophy and the Arts. Royal Institute of Philosophy Lectures. Palgrave, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-01342-5_6
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-01342-5_6
Publisher Name: Palgrave, London
Print ISBN: 978-1-349-01344-9
Online ISBN: 978-1-349-01342-5
eBook Packages: Palgrave Religion & Philosophy CollectionPhilosophy and Religion (R0)