Abstract
In this paper I shall attempt to throw light on the role of the concept of future in our understanding of the notion of personal identity, which I hope will help to do something to solve some difficulties in the mind—body problem.
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Notes
See, for instance, W. Sellars, in ‘The Identity Approach to the Problem’, in Review of Metaphysics (March 1965), who is sceptical about the value of formulating the problem in this way.
Thomas Nagel, ‘Physicalism’, in Philosophical Review (July 1965), who is sympathetic to this way of stating the claim.
Cf. D. Wiggins, Identity and Spatio-Temporal Continuity (1967) p. 4g.
C. A. van Peursen, Body, Soul, Spirit, English ed., trans. H. H. Hoskins (1966) p. 128.
Cf. e.g. Keith Donnellan, ‘Knowing What I am Doing’, Journal of Philosophy (1963).
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© 1972 The Royal Institute of Philosophy
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Ishiguro, H. (1972). A Person’s Future and the Mind-Body Problem. In: Mays, W., Brown, S.C. (eds) Linguistic Analysis and Phenomenology. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-01215-2_12
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-01215-2_12
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