Abstract
In Chapter 2 I listed three objections to the account of perception which involves extending the causal chain beyond the brain. The first objection—that the sense-impression is said to be a modification of a non-extended substance the essence of which is thought, and yet is extended and is unlike a thought in that it is not true or false of anything—was met by making the essence of mind privacy, not thought.
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© 1971 G. N. A. Vesey
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Vesey, G. (1971). The High Road to Phenomenalism. In: Perception. Problems of Philosophy. Palgrave, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-01004-2_4
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-01004-2_4
Publisher Name: Palgrave, London
Print ISBN: 978-0-333-11773-6
Online ISBN: 978-1-349-01004-2
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