Free Will pp 71-80 | Cite as

The Consistency Hypothesis

  • D. J. O’Connor
Part of the Problems of Philosophy book series

Abstract

we have seen how the dispute between determinists and libertarians arises in the form of a paradox. There are two propositions, each of which seems acceptable to common sense and yet each entails the falsity of the other. If all physical events have causes, then no human actions can be free. And conversely, if some human actions are free, it must be false that all physical events have causes. The existence of such paradoxes is proof that we are in an intellectual muddle, and such muddles can be cleared up in one of two ways. Either we must show that at least one of the offending propositions is false or we must show that each does not really, in spite of first appearances, entail the negation of the other.

Keywords

Metaphor Kleptomania 

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Copyright information

© D. J. O’Connor 1971

Authors and Affiliations

  • D. J. O’Connor

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