Free Will pp 121-123 | Cite as


  • D. J. O’Connor
Part of the Problems of Philosophy book series


we have seen that neither the determinist nor the libertarian arguments suffice to establish their case. The determinist extrapolates imprudently from what seems to be established knowledge of the ways in which nature works. The libertarian finds it difficult to state his case in a way that makes it entirely clear what he is claiming and, at the same time, is consistent with reliable scientific knowledge. On the balance of the arguments examined here (which are only a part of the total body of argument on the issue), the determinist seems to be in a slightly stronger position. What he needs to prove his case is more evidence of the same kind that he has already, although it is more than doubtful if such evidence could ever be complete or that we could know that it was. What his opponent needs is a radically new insight into the difficulties of the problem.


Human Knowledge Strong Position Philosophical Discussion Intellectual Virtue Establish Knowledge 
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© D. J. O’Connor 1971

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  • D. J. O’Connor

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