Free Will pp 111-119 | Cite as

A Second Look at Fatalism

  • D. J. O’Connor
Part of the Problems of Philosophy book series

Abstract

we must now return to take a second look at a line of argument that was set out in Chapter 3—the logical argument for fatalism. The form in which it was set out there is due to the Polish logician Jan Lukasiewicz.50 And it will have been seen, that if we accept the premises of the argument, which appear to be unexceptionable, we must accept the conclusion; namely, that propositions about the future can be true or false. And if this is so, then what they assert is bound to occur if they are true; and bound not to occur if they are false.

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Copyright information

© D. J. O’Connor 1971

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  • D. J. O’Connor

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