Berkeley pp 92-106 | Cite as


  • Harry M. Bracken
Part of the Philosophers in Perspective book series


I have been exploring the various themes in Berkeley’s Principles with which he attacks material substance and defends esse is percipi. There are four distinguishable but closely related themes: first, the anti-abstractionism which plays so important a role in the Introduction and is then utilised in support of esse is percipi; second, the likeness principle which is used not only against the primary/secondary quality distinction but against representative realism as well; third, the analysis of the roots of scepticism and the consequent effort to construct a theory in which the sceptical dialectic cannot take hold; fourth, the ontological inherence of perceptual experiences and the corollary doctrine of substance.


Class Membership Secondary Quality Naive Realism Likeness Principle Cherry Tree 
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© Harry M. Bracken 1974

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  • Harry M. Bracken

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