Scepticism is not readily formulated as a principle in the way in which anti-abstractionism may be, but it too is essential to an understanding of Berkeley. First, because esse is percipi is designed to cut off the very ‘root of scepticism’ — that distinction between perception and reality on which Pyrrhonism rests. Second, scepticism provides massive support, via the arguments from sense variations, for the inherence principle. That is, the arguments support the thesis that sensory data are psychologically dependent; a thesis which contributes in turn to the stronger claim that sensory data are ontologically dependent upon (mental) substances.
KeywordsSensory Data Material Substance Material Thing Imperfect Knowledge Sense Variation
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