Abstract
We have seen in the previous chapter that the Recurrence and Resemblance theories agree in rejecting the view (usually called “extreme nominalism”) that in our use of general terms we group things in a completely arbitrary way. We must now try to see what this distinction between “arbitrary” and “non-arbitrary” grouping amounts to.
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Suggestions for Further Reading
Bambrough, R., “Universals and Family Resemblances,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, volume LX (1960–61). Also in Loux, M. J. (ed.), Universals and Particulars (New York, 1970).
Wittgenstein, L., Blue and Brown Books (Oxford and New York, 1958).
Wittgenstein, L., Philosophical Investigations (Oxford and New York, 1963).
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© 1972 Hilary Staniland
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Staniland, H. (1972). General Terms. In: Universals. Problems of Philosophy. Palgrave, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-00885-8_4
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-00885-8_4
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