Abstract
In the previous two chapters, we have considered the theories of universals put forward by various specific philosophers. But the Recurrence and Resemblance theories, which we shall be considering in this chapter, cannot in the same way be labeled with the names of particular philosophers. Rather, they are two possible types of view which in the present century have formed the starting point for discussions of universals in the work of many different philosophers. They represent the attempts of these philosophers to formulate what seemed to them the most plausible versions of realism and of anti-realism, without relating either too closely to specific views on other philosophical questions.
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Suggestions for Further Reading
Aaron, R. I., The Theory of Universals (New York and London, 1967), Part II.
Price, H. H., Thinking and Experience (London, 1953).
Russell, Bertrand, Inquiry into Meaning and Truth (London and New York, 1956), Chapter 25.
Russell, Bertrand, Problems of Philosophy (London and New York, 1912), Chapters 9 and 10.
Woozley, A. D., “Universals,” in Theory of Knowledge (London and New York, 1949).
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© 1972 Hilary Staniland
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Staniland, H. (1972). Recurrence and Resemblance. In: Universals. Problems of Philosophy. Palgrave, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-00885-8_3
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-00885-8_3
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