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Pragmatic Analysis

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Belief and Knowledge

Part of the book series: Problems in Philosophy ((PRPH))

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Abstract

To this point, we have not considered iterated knowledge operators as we did iterated belief operators earlier. Consider the following formulae, where p abstracts some factual sentence:

  1. (1)

    KaKap ⊃ Kap.

  2. (2)

    Kap ⊃ KaKap.

Clearly (1) seems to be true, but (2) is the subject of considerable controversy. It may be useful to begin a discussion by indicating the connection between Ideal Analysis and an acceptance of (1) and (2) as conditions on knowledge.

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© 1972 Robert John Ackermann

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Ackermann, R.J. (1972). Pragmatic Analysis. In: Belief and Knowledge. Problems in Philosophy. Palgrave, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-00881-0_6

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