Abstract
In chapter 5 we argued that although mental states are indeed inner causes apt to produce behavior, this is not all they are. Mental states have also, among their mental properties, phenomenal properties; and it was urged that awareness by phenomenal properties is incompatible with a purely materialist doctrine of the inner, mental causes of behavior.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution.
Preview
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
Copyright information
© 1970 Keith Campbell
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Campbell, K. (1970). A New Epiphenomenalism. In: Body and Mind. Problems of Philosophy. Palgrave, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-00678-6_6
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-00678-6_6
Publisher Name: Palgrave, London
Print ISBN: 978-1-349-00680-9
Online ISBN: 978-1-349-00678-6
eBook Packages: Palgrave Religion & Philosophy CollectionPhilosophy and Religion (R0)