Advertisement

The German Problem to the End of the First Hague Conference, 1929

  • David Carlton

Abstract

However divided British statesmen were on the issue of the League of Nations and collective security, they were almost unanimous in their desire to pacify and conciliate pre-Hitler Germany. Certainly all members of the second Labour Government earnestly believed that solutions to the outstanding questions relating to Germany, especially those concerning reparations and the early evacuation of occupation forces from the Rhineland, were both desirable and attainable; and in this respect at least they also had the support of most of the outgoing Conservative Ministers. But if there was no divergence of aim between the two administrations, there was undoubtedly a contrast in the methods employed, for whereas Austen Chamberlain and his colleagues had sought European pacification in close co-operation with Paris, most of the new Labour Ministers preferred the tactic of pushing rather than cajoling the French into making concessions to Germany.

Keywords

International Affair Labour Party Collective Security Financial Committee Early Evacuation 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

Preview

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Notes

  1. 1.
    See W. R. Tucker, The Attitude of the British Labour Party towards European and Collective Security Problems,1920–1939 (Geneva, 1950 ) pp. 85–93, for a detailed examination of the issues involved.Google Scholar
  2. 3.
    More detailed accounts are to be found in W. M. Jordan, Great Britain, France and the German Problem,1918–1939 (London, 1943 ) pp. 502–29.Google Scholar
  3. Andrew McFadyean, Reparation Reviewed (London, 1930).Google Scholar
  4. Hans Ronde, Von Versailles bis Lausanne: Der Verlauf der Reparationsverhandlungen nach dem ersten Weltkrieg (Stuttgart and Cologne, 1950).Google Scholar
  5. Arnold J. Toynbee, Survey of International Affairs, 1924(London, 1926) pp. 323–99.Google Scholar
  6. Arnold J. Toynbee et al., Survey of International Affairs, 1929 (London, 1930) pp. 111–66.Google Scholar
  7. 1.
    Julius Curtius, Der Young-Plan: Entstellung und Wahrheit (Stuttgart, 1950) P. 13.Google Scholar
  8. 2.
    E. N. Peterson, Hjalmar Schacht: For and Against Hitler: A Political-Economic Study of Germany, 1923–1945,(Boston, 1954 ) p. 83.Google Scholar
  9. 3.
    The Young Report was published in Great Britain as Cmd. 3343 of 1929–30. For a useful short summary of the implications of the Plan, see Thomas W. Lamont, ‘The Final Reparations Settlement’, Foreign Affairs (New York), Vii (1929–30) 336–63.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  10. 2.
    C. G. Dawes, Journal as Ambassador to Great Britain (New York, 1939 ) p. 44Google Scholar
  11. 2.
    Sir Frederick Leith-Ross, Money Talks: Fifty Years of International Finance (London, 1968) p. 124. Leith-Ross’s three colleagues were Pierre Quesnay of France, Alberto Pirelli of Italy and Emile Francqui of Belgium.Google Scholar
  12. 1.
    Hjalmar Schacht, The End of Reparations (New York, 1931) p. 100.Google Scholar
  13. 2.
    Arnold J. Toynbee et al., Survey of International Affairs, 1930 (London,1931) p. 507.Google Scholar
  14. 1.
    Ludwig Zimmermann, Deutsche Aussenpolitik in der Ara der Weimarer Republik (Göttingen, 1958) pp. 378–9. See also Henderson to Lindsay, telegram no. 65,30 Aug 1929, Foreign Office Confidential Prints and General Correspondence, Public Record Office (hereafter abbreviated to F.O.), 408/54.Google Scholar
  15. 2.
    For details of Briand’s attitude towards the evacuation of the Rhineland, see Arnold J. Toynbee, Survey of International Affairs, 1927 (London, 1929) pp.109–14, and Toynbee et al., Survey of International Affairs, 1929, pp. 167–80.Google Scholar
  16. 5.
    Ibid., pp. 379–80. See also Paul Schmidt, Statist auf diplomatischer Biihne, 1923–1945 (Bonn, 1949) p. 180.Google Scholar
  17. 4.
    Curtius’s tear jerking account (Sechs Jahre Minister der Deutschen Republik (Heidelberg, 1948) p. 90) was rather less than fair to the French delegates, whose conciliatory conduct was far ahead of the bulk of their compatriots. According to Curtius, a supposedly despairing Stresemann clutched his heart at 1.3o a.m. and cried out ‘Ich kann nicht mehr’. But Curtius took no account of the difficulties Briand had to face in justifying his actions to the French Chamber of Deputies. For this see Arnold Wolfers, Britain and France between Two Wars: Conflicting Strategies of Peace since Versailles (New York, 1940) p. 82.Google Scholar
  18. 2.
    Hugh Dalton, ‘British Foreign Policy, 1929–1931’, Political Quarterly, II (1931) 493.Google Scholar
  19. 1.
    Ibid., p. 494. For a similar view see Arthur Salter, Recovery — The Second Effort (London, 1932) p. 247.Google Scholar
  20. 5.
    For example in Quintin Hogg (sometime Lord Hailsham), The Left was Never Right (London, 1945) p. 121.Google Scholar

Copyright information

© David Carlton 1970

Authors and Affiliations

  • David Carlton

There are no affiliations available

Personalised recommendations