Proposals of Valuations

  • William A. Christian
Part of the Philosophy of Religion Series book series (PHRES)


In this chapter we study utterances of religious doctrines in S which have the force of proposing valuations. A valuation is a judgement that something or other, for example some occasion of experience or some existent object, is good or bad in a certain way. Some of the distinctions between different types of valuations made by C. I. Lewis will be useful, especially later on. (a) An utterance ascribing intrinsic value to something says it is good for its own sake, as an end in itself. Lewis thinks judgements of this type apply only to ‘the content of some actual or possible experience’. (b) An utterance ascribing inherent value to something says it is ‘good without reference to any further object’, since an intrinsic value is findable in its presence. Judgements of this type apply to actual or possible existents including states of affairs. (c) An utterance ascribing contributory value to something says that it contributes in some way to some intrinsic value (1).


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  1. 4.
    E.g., G. H. von Wright, ‘The Logic of Preference’ (Edinburgh University Press, 1963).Google Scholar
  2. 6.
    See Gershom G. Scholem’s discussions of devekuth, which he translates in this way, in ‘Major Trends in Jewish Mysticism’ (New York: Schocken Books, 1961).Google Scholar

Copyright information

© William A. Christian 1972

Authors and Affiliations

  • William A. Christian
    • 1
  1. 1.Timothy Dwight CollegeYale UniversityUSA

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