An Assessment of the Cultural and Organisational Effects

  • R. B. McKersie
  • L. C. Hunter


In this chapter we turn to the impact of productivity bargaining on the cultural and organisational setting of workplace relations. First, we examine the influence of productivity agreements on the key institutions of the workplace: the management and union organisations. Attention then moves to the cultural effects and especially the impact on the individual and the work-group. This discussion leads naturally to the control issue and an analysis of shop-floor relations. The next step is to present an assessment of the effect of productivity bargaining on the structure of collective bargaining. Finally, an evaluation is made of the direct and indirect strategies.


Collective Bargaining Industrial Relation Electricity Supply Indirect Approach Unit Labour Cost 
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Copyright information

© R. B. McKersie and L. C. Hunter 1973

Authors and Affiliations

  • R. B. McKersie
    • 1
  • L. C. Hunter
    • 2
  1. 1.New York State School of Industrial and Labor RelationsCornell UniversityUSA
  2. 2.University of GlasgowUK

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