Substantive Results of Productivity Agreements

  • R. B. McKersie
  • L. C. Hunter


The purpose of this chapter is to examine the substantive results that have emerged from productivity agreements. In the next chapter we will consider the impact of productivity bargaining on the institutions and culture of the workplace. This division of subject matter is close but not exactly parallel to the contrast we have drawn in earlier chapters between short-run and long-run goals sought by the parties to the agreement, and it is also possible to see some respective reflection of the direct and indirect strategies.


Collective Bargaining Electricity Supply Wage Increase Unit Labour Cost Substantive Result 
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  1. 1.
    The Blue Book at Fawley contained an estimate that mates were only about 40 per cent as productive as the craftsmen they assisted. Cf. A. Flanders, The Fawley Productivity Agreements (London: Faber & Faber, 1964) 170.Google Scholar
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  18. 44.
    And even a one-time member of the Board has offered a more pessimistic estimate. He said that as many agreements were spurious as were soundly based. Hugh Clegg, How to Run an Incomes Policy and Why We Made Such a Mess of the Last One (London: Heinemann, 1971) 38.Google Scholar
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Copyright information

© R. B. McKersie and L. C. Hunter 1973

Authors and Affiliations

  • R. B. McKersie
    • 1
  • L. C. Hunter
    • 2
  1. 1.New York State School of Industrial and Labor RelationsCornell UniversityUSA
  2. 2.University of GlasgowUK

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