Mind and Body

  • Hywel D. Lewis
Part of the Philosophy of Religion Series book series (PHRES)


When we turn to the question of what it is for us to be the persons we are, there seem to be two things to say about it at once. It is plain that, in life as we know it now at least, we have bodies, and it seems also clear that we are in some way more than our bodies, that we have minds as well. This is how we would put it for rough and ready purposes. But what does it mean to say that we have a mind, or for that matter, that we have a body? When we speak of having something we usually think of some entity which, as we say, belongs to us. But there is also a looser use of the verb ‘to have’ in these contexts, as when we say that we ‘have’ a pain. If we say that we ‘have a mind’ are we referring to some kind of entity, and in what sense would we say that this entity belongs to us? And is the body an entity, and in what way does it belong to us? Are we composite beings, having both mind and body in some relation to one another? If so, is one part or the other dispensable, and what, in any case, is the relation between them?


External World Physical Thing Perceptual Awareness Walk Away Formal Dialectic 
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Copyright information

© Hywel D. Lewis 1973

Authors and Affiliations

  • Hywel D. Lewis
    • 1
  1. 1.King’s CollegeUniversity of LondonUK

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