One’s Knowledge of Other Minds

  • A. J. Ayer

Abstract

Let us see how there comes to be a problem about one’s knowledge of other minds. Consider the following propositions:
  1. (1)

    When someone, other than myself, says that he is thinking about a philosophical problem, or that he has a headache, or that he has seen a ghost, what he is saying about himself is the same as what I should be saying about myself if I were to say that I was thinking about a philosophical problem, or that I had a headache, or that I had seen a ghost.

     
  2. (2)

    When I say of someone other than myself that he is thinking about a philosophical problem, or that he has a headache, or that he has seen a ghost, what I am saying about him is the same as what I should be saying about myself if I were to say that I was thinking about a philosophical problem, or that I had a headache, or that I had seen a ghost.

     
  3. (3)

    When I say that I am thinking about a philosophical problem, or that I have a headache, or that I have seen a ghost, my statement is not equivalent to any statement, or set of statements, however complicated, about my overt behaviour.

     

Keywords

Microbe Ghost Defend 

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Copyright information

© Palgrave Macmillan, a division of Macmillan Publishers Limited 1972

Authors and Affiliations

  • A. J. Ayer
    • 1
  1. 1.University of OxfordUK

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