Abstract
I shall be concerned in this paper with phenomenalism as a theory of perception. In the form in which it is usually held nowadays, it is the theory that physical objects are logical constructions out of sense-data. Assuming that we understand what is meant by a physical object, in the sense in which chairs and tables and match-boxes are physical objects, we are left with the questions: What is a logical construction? and What are sense-data? At the risk of repeating an excessively familiar story, I shall begin with the sense-data.
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Notes
G. F. Stout, ‘Phenomenalism’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 1938–39.
W. F. R. Hardie, ‘The Paradox of Phenomenalism’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 1945–46.
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© 1972 Palgrave Macmillan, a division of Macmillan Publishers Limited
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Ayer, A.J. (1972). Phenomenalism. In: Philosophical Essays. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-00132-3_6
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-00132-3_6
Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, London
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