• A. J. Ayer


I shall be concerned in this paper with phenomenalism as a theory of perception. In the form in which it is usually held nowadays, it is the theory that physical objects are logical constructions out of sense-data. Assuming that we understand what is meant by a physical object, in the sense in which chairs and tables and match-boxes are physical objects, we are left with the questions: What is a logical construction? and What are sense-data? At the risk of repeating an excessively familiar story, I shall begin with the sense-data.


Physical Object Physical Level Causal Property Logical Construction Philosophical Essay 
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  1. 1.
    G. F. Stout, ‘Phenomenalism’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 1938–39.Google Scholar
  2. 1.
    W. F. R. Hardie, ‘The Paradox of Phenomenalism’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 1945–46.Google Scholar

Copyright information

© Palgrave Macmillan, a division of Macmillan Publishers Limited 1972

Authors and Affiliations

  • A. J. Ayer
    • 1
  1. 1.University of OxfordUK

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