Wage Structures in Less-Developed Countries

  • Elliot J. Berg


Issues of wage structure — how the various sets of wages in the economy are and should be related to each other — are at the centre of wage policy questions in the less-developed countries. Yet they have not received theoretical attention; theoretical literature on economic development focuses only on the general level of wages. Nor have they received much empirical study either. To my knowledge, there is not a single country study examining in detail the wage structure of a less-developed economy.


Minimum Wage Wage Rate Civil Service Ivory Coast Unskilled Worker 
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© The International Institute for Labour Studies 1969

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  • Elliot J. Berg

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