Abstract
Rousseau’s aim in O. of I., as I pointed out in the last chapter, was to show that the injustices of society and the wickedness of individual men are due, not to the original nature of man, but to artificial corruptions of that nature and of man’s natural way of life. The negative part of this programme has been fulfilled in Part I: man in his natural state has been shown, to Rousseau’s satisfaction if not to ours, to have been solitary and therefore innocent. In Part II we have the positive part of the programme. Continuing with his historical method, Rousseau will aim to show, for each feature of civilised life and each elaboration of society, first how its introduction was not an inevitable development of human nature, but was the result of chance and of deliberate choice; and secondly how it resulted both in a corruption of man’s original innocence of character and also in the development of injustice in men’s relationships with each other. Social inequality is thus shown to be not merely bad in itself, but also wrong, not being justifiable either as being itself part of human nature, or as an inevitable consequence of man’s natural development. Rousseau does not himself draw the conclusion that all existing social institutions and conventions should be scrapped, but the reader can easily draw it for himself.
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© 1973 John C. Hall
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Hall, J.C. (1973). Theory of Existing Society. In: Rousseau. Philosophers in Perspective. Palgrave, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-00018-0_3
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-00018-0_3
Publisher Name: Palgrave, London
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Online ISBN: 978-1-349-00018-0
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