Relationship Lending in Emerging Markets: Evidence from the Czech Republic

  • Adam Geršl
  • Petr Jakubík


A firm that relies on bank credit can choose whether to borrow from just one bank or whether to obtain financing from multiple banks. The use of one lender is often termed relationship lending and is most often cited as a characteristic of the German banking system.1 Available anecdotal evidence suggests that this model is also present in other economies, including emerging markets. This article sets out to determine which bank financing model predominates in the Czech Republic, what its main characteristics are, and what factors the choice of bank financing model depends on at firm level. We also analyse whether the model chosen has a significant effect on the credit risk in the portfolios of relationship lenders.


Czech Republic Credit Risk Bank Loan Large Bank Foreign Bank 
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Copyright information

© Adam Geršl and Petr Jakubík 2016

Authors and Affiliations

  • Adam Geršl
    • 1
  • Petr Jakubík
    • 2
    • 3
  1. 1.Czech National BankPragueCzech Republic
  2. 2.Institute of Economic StudiesCharles University in PraguePragueCzech Republic
  3. 3.European Central BankFrankfurt am MainGermany

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