Relations with Conservative African States (1945–62)

  • Philip Muehlenbeck


Soon after the Czechoslovak state was created from the ashes of World War I, its leaders understood that because it was a small, democratic state surrounded by larger, undemocratic, and potentially hostile neighbors (Germany, the Soviet Union, and the remnants of the Austrian-Hungarian Empire), it could not stand isolated in the international system, and instead must develop relationships outside of Central Europe in order to ensure its security. Establishing diplomatic missions abroad in support of the state’s political and economic interests was therefore viewed as vitally important. By the mid-1920s, the Czechoslovak diplomatic network had become one of the largest in the world—and was much more extensive than nearly any other state of comparable size.1 Czechoslovak diplomatic and consular missions were established, not only in Europe and North America, but also in countries such as India, China, Japan, Australia, Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico.


Foreign Policy Communist Party Ivory Coast African National Congress Diplomatic Relation 
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© Philip Muehlenbeck 2016

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  • Philip Muehlenbeck

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