An Urban Revolution in Egypt?

  • Roman Stadnicki
Part of the The Sciences Po Series in International Relations and Political Economy book series (SPIRP)


In Egypt, since 2011, the “formal city,” the areas of the city designed and planned by public services, has been partially obstructed. The revolution appears to have brought to a standstill the urban projects that had been negotiated between the highest offices of state and an oligarchy of businessmen controlling real estate. This was the case, for instance, of the “Greater Cairo 2050” plan from the Mubarak era, which had been created in the spirit of international competition and the conquest of the desert. In addition to the postponement of major projects, every institution involved in their development became lethargic, including those responsible for planning, who were threatened with layoffs, local authorities who did not get involved, as well as public and private real estate developers paralyzed by their financial difficulties. The army still controls access to city centers—where protesters assemble—by building walls, verifying the identities of pedestrians and drivers, or impeding road maintenance.


Civil Society Real Estate Social Housing Urban Space Informal Economy 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.


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© Roman Stadnicki 2016

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  • Roman Stadnicki

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