From Forbidden Modern to Guiltless Modernity

  • Neslihan Cevik


These statements are part of my separate conversations with Keriman and Nur on compatibilities and divergences between Islam and modernity (and the West). Both human rights activists, Nur and Keriman are veiled women who both claim to conduct a life in Istanbul in careful observance of Islam’s rules. Whereas Keriman sharply divides Islam and modernity, Nur points to convergences between the two. Rather than being idiosyncrasies, these views represent two distinct religious formations in Turkey: Islamism versus Muslimism.


European Union Democrat Party Political Sphere Associational Life National Vision 
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© Neslihan Cevik 2016

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  • Neslihan Cevik

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