Comparison with International Humanitarian Law
In the previous chapter, Islamic law was found to be the most influential norm for the Taliban members although the interpretation of Islamic law is manipulative to befit the political objective of the Taliban. Returning to the hypothetical legitimization paths (Table 3.1), the second path (f–e) assumes that the Layeha aims at adapting the behavior of the Taliban to the expectations of the external audience. The definition of external audience is vast and the research chose to focus upon the international community as represented by the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) since the leadership seems to be particularly sensitive to UNAMA’s reports and accusations.
KeywordsCommon People Armed Group Geneva Convention Direct Part Armed Attack
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