The purpose of this book is to test the following four hypotheses throughout its analysis. First, it hypothesizes the fact that legitimacy is the main driver for the rise and fall of the Taliban movement, and that the Taliban leadership is cognizant of the importance of legitimacy ahead of material strength or coercion.


International Norm Geneva Convention Political Dynamic Civilian Casualty Internal Legitimacy 


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© Yoshinobu Nagamine 2015

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  • Yoshinobu Nagamine

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