The Risk Bearer

Reducing Uncertainty
  • Marina Krakovsky


Every business person deals with risk, but middlemen are in a unique position to profit from it. To play the Risk Bearer role well, they must understand the workings of risk.


Venture Capital Moral Hazard Trading Partner Adverse Selection External Risk 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.


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Copyright information

© Marina Krakovsky 2015

Authors and Affiliations

  • Marina Krakovsky

There are no affiliations available

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