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The Bridge

Spanning the Chasm
  • Marina Krakovsky

Abstract

Early in World War II, the Germans captured a young British soldier named R. A. Radford and sent him to an Italian Oflag, a prisoner of war camp for officers. The camp, like other Oflags, was run in accord with the Geneva Convention, which meant, among other things, that the prisoners didn’t have to work to earn their keep. The captors took care of the prisoners’ basic needs, and in addition the captives received occasional parcels from the Red Cross—packages consisting of canned beef and salmon, milk and butter and cheese, even small luxuries like cigarettes and chocolate. A few lucky prisoners received private care packages as well.

Keywords

Child Care Social Distance Market Maker Structural Hole Geneva Convention 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Notes

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Copyright information

© Marina Krakovsky 2015

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  • Marina Krakovsky

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