Democracy and Economic Development

  • Mustapha Kamel Nabli
Part of the International Economic Association Series book series (IEA)


The linkages between democracy or democratization and economic development, mostly as captured by economic growth, continue to be a subject of controversy with very few well established facts and relationships. From a review of evidence three main findings can be mentioned.1


Good Governance Electoral System Arab Country State Capacity Democratic Institution 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.


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© International Economic Association 2016

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  • Mustapha Kamel Nabli

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