The Causal and Moral Complexity of Politics

  • Michele Chiaruzzi
Part of the Palgrave Macmillan History of International Thought book series (PMHIT)


“The rational control of our affairs and our consciousness of moral rectitude” [43] are two major critical issues in politics, taken under discussion because “in politics intentions are seldom fulfilled, and consequences elude reckoning” [44]. “Fortune’s Banter,” then, deals with one of the timeless issues of social life and has at its center the intricate relationship between political environment and individual freedom of action. Or rather, at its center there is the degree of freedom of action and the difficulties arising from this ever-relative condition.


French Revolution United Nations Security Council Political Complexity Moral Complexity Historical Terminus 
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© Michele Chiaruzzi 2016

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  • Michele Chiaruzzi

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