Anti-Luck Virtue Epistemology

  • Duncan Pritchard
Part of the Palgrave Philosophy Today book series (PPT)


We noted back in chapter 1, when we were considering the question of how to analyse knowledge, that there are two overarching intuitions about knowledge. The first — the ability intuition — was that knowledge is due to cognitive ability. The second — the anti-luck intuition — was that knowledge excludes luck. When we first introduced these two intuitions about knowledge we also noted that one could regard them as closely related. What does it take to ensure that one’s true belief is not due to luck? Well, that it is the product of one’s cognitive ability. Conversely, insofar as one’s true belief is the product of one’s cognitive ability, then one would expect it to thereby be immune to knowledge-undermining luck.


True Belief Virtue Epistemology Epistemic Luck Cognitive Success Epistemic Dependence 
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Copyright information

© Duncan Pritchard 2016

Authors and Affiliations

  • Duncan Pritchard
    • 1
  1. 1.University of EdinburghUK

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