Market Discipline, Public Disclosure and Financial Stability

  • Rhiannon Sowerbutts
  • Peter Zimmerman


Inadequate disclosure by commercial banks has been cited as a contributing factor to the financial crisis. Banks did not report enough information about the assets they were holding or the risks that they were exposed to, and inadequate disclosure meant that investors were less able to judge risks to a bank’s solvency than bank insiders, such as managers. Investors did not demand sufficient disclosure prior to the crisis. Possible reasons for this include risk illusion, or expectations that governments would be willing and able to bail out failing banks.


Credit Risk Credit Rating Financial Stability Capital Ratio Public Disclosure 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.


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© Rhiannon Sowerbutts and Peter Zimmerman 2016

Authors and Affiliations

  • Rhiannon Sowerbutts
  • Peter Zimmerman

There are no affiliations available

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