East Asia: Understanding the Broken Harmony in Confucian Asia

  • Ching-Chang Chen


East Asia is often seen as a region where international relations is still characterized by severe security competition. The sovereignty dispute over the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands, administrated by Japan but also claimed by China, has been one of the regional flashpoints involving competition for fishery resources and potential oil reserves. In September 2010, a Chinese trawler collided with a Japan Coast Guard patrol boat in waters near the contested islands, and Beijing allegedly delayed the export of rare earth metals to Japan. Tensions continued to build up, especially after the Japanese government bought the Senkakus from their private landlord in September 2012. This move triggered a series of large-scale anti-Japanese demonstrations in major Chinese cities, a slump in Japanese exports to China and in Chinese tourists to Japan, and frequent appearance of Chinese patrol vessels and aircraft in the surrounding waters and airspace.


Qing Dynasty Western Power Tribute System Harmonious World Major Chinese City 
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© Ching-Chang Chen 2016

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  • Ching-Chang Chen

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