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Core Welfare Modeling Factors

  • Chris Harris

Abstract

Our objective in this book is to establish welfare functions that can be used in policy. Our key factors are utility, welfare, surplus, and inequality. We have established how these are related to the politics, political economics, and approach to contract. We now view how they are connected to each other.

Keywords

Utility Function Marginal Utility Indifference Curve Capital Asset Price Model Hyperbolic Discount 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Notes

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© Chris Harris 2015

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  • Chris Harris

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