Ryle’s Conceptual Cartography

  • Julia Tanney
Part of the History of Analytic Philosophy book series (History of Analytic Philosophy)


Interested as a young philosopher in the ‘massive developments in logical theory’ of the early part of the 20th century (many of which he ‘read back’ into the works of the mature Plato).1 Ryle found himself sympathizing with Platonic, because anti-psychologistic, theories of meaning.2 Yet, from the start, he was convinced that this Platonic ‘tendency to populate the world with Objects’ had to be resisted.


Philosophical Investigation Abstract Noun Logical Power Compass Bearing Local Snapshot 
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© Julia Tanney 2013

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  • Julia Tanney

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